DECEPTIVE NEGOTIATING: THE ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CUE

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ABSTRACT

Recent psychological research on deception has focused on environmental cues—features of the physical and temporal environment (e.g., money, mirrors) that can influence an individual’s decision to deceive. Although research on the social situation of negotiation has examined numerous reasons why negotiators deceive, it has not often explored the role of environmental cues. The current paper seeks to motivate greater attention to environmental cues in the literature on deception in negotiation. After synthesizing the psychological evidence on environmental cues and deception in individual decision-making situations, I translate that evidence for the social decision-making situation of negotiation and the more general set of social decision-making situations in organizations (using mergers and acquisitions as an example). Ultimately, theoretical overlap between the deception and negotiation literatures leads me to conclude that environmental cues could have an even greater influence on deception in social decision-making situations, suggesting that scholars of negotiation and several other management topics would benefit by considering the surrounding physical and temporal environment.

Keywords: negotiation, ethics, deception, situation, environmental cue
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All negotiations occur in space and time. Negotiators sit in a room with sights, smells, and objects—even tastes if they happen to be eating or drinking. Or they negotiate virtually from two separate spaces, each with its own physical characteristics. In-person or virtual, negotiations take place at a particular time and over a particular period. In short, any negotiation unfolds within a specific physical and temporal environment.

Across their physical and temporal environments, negotiators often choose to deceive each other: Deception is common and consequential in negotiations (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013). Although the negotiation literature has documented several factors that can lead negotiators to deceive—their character traits (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014), cognitive limitations (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), and expectations (Shell, 1991), for example—few papers have considered the potentially causal role of their immediate physical and temporal situations. This is particularly surprising since the immediate situation features prominently or even predominantly in recent psychological research on deception (e.g., Ayal, Gino, Barkan, & Ariely, 2015). A wide array of papers in this literature show that environmental cues—features of the surrounding physical or temporal situation like the presence of money or mirrors—can profoundly influence non-negotiators’ propensity to deceive.

How might environmental cues influence negotiators’ deception? At present, little evidence speaks to this question. The answer is critical, as the negotiation literature may otherwise overlook some important causes of deception. Yet, the answer is not obvious: Since the psychological research on deception generally focuses on individual rather than social decision-making situations, it is not immediately clear how the deception literature’s findings might generalize. The current paper seeks to synthesize the psychological findings regarding
environmental influences on deception, translate those findings for negotiation and the broader class of social decision-making situations in organizations (using mergers and acquisitions as an example), and suggest that the negotiation and several other management literatures would benefit by considering environmental cues more carefully.

In particular, I seek to bridge the theoretical divide between the negotiation and psychological deception literatures, asking whether and how specific environmental cues might influence negotiators’ deception. To that end, the current paper first reviews the psychological deception literature, describing its underlying theoretical framework and grouping the documented environmental cues into six categories (e.g., money, time). Next, it compares the deception literature’s theoretical framework against an important theoretical framework used in the negotiation literature, surfacing considerable theoretical overlap but one notable difference: negotiation is an inherently social decision-making situation in which multiple individuals interact to decide together. This observation suggests several mechanisms by which environmental cues may hold even greater sway over negotiators’ deception. I draw upon these mechanisms to outline the many ways that environmental cues could influence negotiators’ deception, highlighting several pressing areas for future research and providing complementary or alternative interpretations of several prominent findings.

Reflecting on the prior sections, the paper concludes that the negotiation literature could achieve a much more comprehensive understanding of negotiators’ deception by considering their physical and temporal situations. To that end, it calls for additional negotiation research on environmental cues and outlines an associated research agenda. Finally, I suggest that a consideration of environmental cues could generate interesting and potentially important
research questions for management scholars studying an array of other interactive social
decision-making situations. A consideration of mergers and acquisitions illustrates the potential.

Overall, I believe that this approach makes three major contributions. First, it contributes
to theoretical progress in the negotiation literature by calling negotiation scholars’ attention to
environmental cues, concisely reviewing the findings from that literature and providing a clear
agenda for future research. Second, it contributes to the deception literature by fleshing out the
underlying theoretical framework and providing a novel categorization system that may help
psychologists (as well as negotiation scholars) integrate the landscape of environmental cues.
Finally, it contributes to the management literature by inviting the many management scholars
who study social decision-making situations to consider the specific features of the environment
that may influence the focal constructs.

**SELF-INTERESTED DECEPTION**

Deception involves the transmission of information that intentionally misleads others
(e.g., Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). While individuals may deceive for pro-social (e.g.,
Levine & Schweitzer, 2015) or pro-organizational (e.g., Umphress & Bingham, 2011) reasons,
they often lie for self-interested reasons, particularly in the domain of negotiation (e.g., Lewicki
& Robinson, 1998). Acknowledging the existence and importance of deception arising from
noble intentions, the current paper focuses on self-interested rather than other forms of deception
(or other negotiation behaviors) for three major reasons.

First, self-interested deception holds major implications for negotiators’ relationships,
processes, and outcomes, particularly when discovered. As just a few examples, self-interested
decception that has been discovered damages a negotiator’s trustworthiness (e.g., Côté, Hideg,
and Van Kleef, 2013; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), which hampers their ability to
exchange the necessary information (Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011). Instead, their counterpart tends to make aggressive demands (Côté et al., 2013) and retaliate, often by the deceptive negotiator’s rejecting offers (Boles et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003; Schweitzer and Croson, 1999). As a result, self-interested deceivers tend to perform worse than honest negotiators (Boles et al., 2000; Côté et al., 2013; Croson et al., 2003), and they develop a bad reputation (Raiffa, 1982) that discourages others from negotiating with them in the future (Boles et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2009). Second, and beyond these immediate consequences of deception for the negotiators, I focus on self-interested deception because of its major macro-economic consequences: tax evasion costs the U.S. government more than $450 billion per year (Matthews, 2016), for example, and the global cost of corruption has been estimated at 5% of worldwide GDP (OECD, 2014; reported in Ayal et al., 2015). Finally, and most simply, I focus on self-interested deception rather than other negotiation behaviors (like information-sharing and offer-making) because the former has received markedly less empirical attention—hence the motivation for the current symposium. In sum, the current paper focuses on self-interested deception (hereafter, just “deception”) because of its negotiation and macroeconomic consequences, as well as the relative paucity of research.

Outside of the negotiation context, psychological research has documented numerous factors that can lead people to deceive: from individual differences like gender (Brady & Wheeler, 1996), character (Cohen et al., 2014), and age (Ruegger & King, 1992); to cognitive limitations like bounded ethicality (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005), blindspots (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011), and a lack of moral awareness (Barnes, Gunia, & Wagner, 2015); to features of a decision like loss framing (Kern & Chugh, 2009), business framing (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), and euphemistic labeling (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996); to social
forces like social norms (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009), social expectations (Shell, 1991), and organizational culture (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998).

The current paper focuses on another category of factors known to influence individuals’ deception: environmental cues, or the features of a person’s surrounding physical and temporal situation (e.g., Ayal et al., 2015). A person’s physical situation, for example, includes the space in which they find themselves and the objects and substances it contains, overtly perceived or otherwise. Their temporal situation, in turn, includes the time-of-day and/or period of time over which a decision occurs. While the distinction between environmental cues and other influences on deception is admittedly fraught with judgment calls, environmental cues differ from the other influences in one relatively clear way: they are physically or temporally present, with time included to reflect its status as the fourth dimension (Minkowski, 1909). In and of themselves, factors like character, bounded ethicality, and loss framing are not physically or temporally present; they represent attributes of a person, cognitive process, or decision, respectively. While the people underlying social influences are physically present, the current paper does not consider social influences because: 1) social forces themselves are not physically present; 2) the psychological literature regarding social influence on deception is too large to review concisely (for an extended review: Moore & Gino, 2013); and 3) the types of social influence often studied in deception research are somewhat different than the social decision-making situation of negotiation, as described below.

In sum, the current paper focuses on the influence of physical and temporal (but non-social) factors on deception, which I call “environmental cues.” Although environmental cues appear to represent a meaningfully separate category of influences on deception, I make no claim that these cues operate through different psychological processes than other influences. Despite
their physical or temporal “presence,” environmental cues undoubtedly influence decisions through their associated mental representations, as do other factors. I also make no claim that environmental cues operate independently of other factors. Quite the contrary, as the antecedents of deception are thought to interact with each other in predicting people’s decision to lie (Treviño, 1986). As just a few examples of the potential interrelationships involving environmental cues: a person’s gender could influence the clothes they wear; the objects in a room could produce a business frame; and the passage of time could solidify social norms. The sections below explore some prominent interlinkages between environmental cues and other influences on deception, calling for future research to explore these relationships and others.

ENVIRONMENTAL CUES AND DECEPTION

Recent psychological research has documented a wide array of physical and temporal factors that can influence people’s propensity to act unethically in general or deceptively in particular. Since no known paper has comprehensively reviewed the literature on environmental cues and deception, at least as defined here, I started by conducting an exhaustive literature search, focusing on the set of top-tier psychological, OB, and generalist journals that probably publish social psychological research most often (see Table 1). In particular, I searched these journals for the set of deception- and morality-related terms that are also listed Table 1. This search produced several hundred articles, from which I extracted the much smaller subset with titles and/or abstracts indicating that they might empirically examine the causal influence of physical spaces, objects or substances within them, and/or time on people’s morally-relevant judgments or behaviors. I read these articles as well as any other relevant articles that they cited (or that cited them).
Reading all of these articles allowed me to further extract the articles that focused on cues—factors that simply cue morally-relevant responses. I excluded papers focusing on factors that actively constrain a person’s morality (e.g., through surveillance) or that involve behaviors in addition to situational factors (e.g., signing a contract). Papers that examined any aspect of morality, not just deception, were retained (e.g., Frank & Gilovich, 1988), as their findings could inform future research on deception. I also retained several papers that considered the priming rather than the physical presence of objects, as primed objects were predicted to operate through the same mental representations as physically present objects. Although the search was not date-restricted, many of the approximately 50 papers that met all of these criteria were published since the year 2000. The following review focuses on the 38 papers that, in my judgment and holistic reading of the literature, best represent its conclusions.¹ Table 1 lists the number of articles in each category.

While reading the papers, I also inductively developed a set of mutually-exclusive categories that could collectively capture the types of environmental cues under investigation. After a series of iterative revisions, I settled on the six categories listed in Table 1. As noted in the introduction and discussion, this categorization system may prove useful to scholars of both negotiation and deception, neither of whom appear to benefit from a framework for organizing the various environmental cues that may influence self-interested deception.

Finally, while reading the papers, I sought to identify the overarching theoretical framework that could describe the basic approach and assumptions used across papers. While the papers were extremely diverse and often empirically- rather than theoretically-oriented, many seemed to adopt a theoretical framework broadly consistent with Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and

¹ Approximately 12 articles were excluded because, up on further consideration, they did not represent an environmental cue or did not hold direct implications for deception or morality.
Ross’s (2004). These authors studied how exposure to business-oriented objects (e.g., briefcases) influences people’s social behavior. Integrating decades of psychological research on priming (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) with the work of material anthropologists who study the social meanings attached to material objects (e.g., Dant, 1999), they argued that objects prime particular situational frames, which help people make sense of ambiguous situations and determine how to act. Thus, in a situation amenable to both competitive and cooperative interpretations like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, exposure to a briefcase primes a business frame and associated concepts like competition, so people tend to see competitive behavior as appropriate and act competitively (Kay et al., 2004).

In sum, Kay and colleagues suggested that material objects prime particular situational frames that disambiguate ambiguous situations and thus guide action. More broadly, Kay et al.’s perspective is consistent with the logic of appropriateness (March, 1994), which suggests that people think about their situations and themselves in-tandem. In particular, according to a logic of appropriateness, people make sense of ambiguous situations by asking, “What would a person like me do in a situation like this?” Both Kay et al. (2004) and many of the reviewed papers on deception suggest that environmental cues shed light on the second part of this question by indicating what type of situation “this” is. Other reviewed papers, however, suggest that environmental cues can shed light on the first part of the question by indicating what kind of person “I” am, i.e., by activating a particular aspect of a person’s identity.

For that reason, I integrate Kay and colleagues’ work with the logic of appropriateness to suggest that the reviewed papers generally adopt the following theoretical framework: environmental cues prime a particular situational frame or aspect of an individual’s identity, which influences their subsequent deceptive behavior. More specifically, environmental cues
often prime self-interested or competitive views of the situation or self, which then cue deception. I now discuss the reviewed papers with this theoretical framework in mind, recognizing that few of the papers make the framework quite so explicit, and some adhere to it more closely than others. The review is organized using the six categories of environmental cues inductively extracted from my review.

Money

Money or objects that symbolize money are omnipresent in the market economy, and an accumulating body of evidence suggests that their mere presence could alter people’s morally-relevant choices and behavior. The largest stream of research on the psychology of money suggests that the mere presence of money activates a market pricing orientation (Fiske, 1991): a view of the situation in which the achievement of a person’s own interests and goals, typically through arms-length transactions, becomes focal (for reviews: Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006; 2008). Although money-induced self-focus may aid in the achievement of a person’s own goals, it also seems to make people less caring, warm, and generous toward others. Consistent with these findings, economics majors, who presumably consider money often, tend to act more self-interestedly than others (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993).

While the above papers have linked money to self-interest, other research has considered money’s influence on explicitly unethical behaviors like cheating. Gino and Pierce (2009) documented the “abundance effect”: the tendency of individuals in the presence of abundant wealth (versus scarcity) to cheat. Across three studies, their participants encountered an experimenter with either several thousand dollars or just a few dollars in cash. Participants who saw thousands of dollars consistently cheated more on a subsequent task, apparently because they experienced scarcity and envy. Similarly, individuals subjected to financial deprivation both
cheated more and judged the cheating of other deprived individuals more leniently, seemingly because they saw the situation as unfair (Sharma, Mazar, Alter, & Ariely, 2014).

Despite using different frameworks (abundant wealth versus deprivation), both of these papers make a similar point: obvious symbols of wealth disparity create a situation in which potentially unethical restorative actions are seen as more appropriate. Other research examines whether more subtle reminders of money might have a similar impact. Across four studies that implicitly activated monetary concepts through word descrambling or images, Kouchaki and colleagues showed that the mere activation of money generates unethical intentions and overt deception by placing decisions into a business frame (Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013). Similarly, the implicit activation of money-related (versus time-related) concepts led people to cheat more by making them less self-reflective (Gino & Mogilner, 2014). Overall, this research suggests that money or objects symbolizing money may motivate unethical behavior by altering the surrounding situational frame.

**Identity-Activating Objects**

The presence of particular objects in a room can activate aspects of a person’s identity (Belk, 1988). Perhaps the most well-known stream of research in this area has focused on objects like mirrors that draw people’s attention to themselves, increasing their sense of objective self-awareness (focus on themselves) rather than subjective self-awareness (focus on the external world), and thus their attention to their own moral standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). In one study, for example, people cheated only 7% of the time when they saw a mirror but 71% of the time when they did not (Diener & Wallbom, 1976). While this research amplified the self-awareness of people in the mirror condition by having them listen to audio recordings of their own voices, subsequent research has replicated the mirror result without the
recording and also suggested that it may be confined to Western cultures (Heine, Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta, & Henrich, 2008). Overall, this stream of research suggests that any objects that increase objective self-awareness (e.g., video cameras pointed at the self; Duval, Duval, & Mulilis, 1992) might reduce unethical behavior, at least in the West.

Other research in this area has focused on consumer products. Despite the widespread use of generic items, for example, one set of lab studies showed that even the incidental use of generic (versus real) computer equipment or cell phone batteries reduced people’s perceived self-worth, as indicated by their expected salary and self-rated attractiveness (Chiou & Chao, 2011). To the extent that ethical action requires a strong moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), generic products could thus undermine ethicality. Similarly, another paper showed that the use of counterfeit products created a sense of inauthenticity that led people to engage in deception: Across three experiments, individuals assigned to wear purportedly counterfeit sunglasses felt inauthentic and thus engaged in elevated cheating (Gino, Norton & Ariely, 2010). Finally, research has focused on green products, showing that exposure to such products increased people’s altruistic behavior, presumably by activating their moral identities, while buying such products actually licensed them to cheat and steal (Mazar & Zhong, 2010).

While not focused on identity-activating objects per se, two final papers about religious and secular moral primes hold direct implications concerning objects. One paper examined the effects of these primes on generosity (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), showing that participants who unscrambled sentences alluding to religion or secular morality (versus control conditions) gave far more money to anonymous counterparts in the dictator game. Similarly, participants in another paper were asked to recall either the Ten Commandments or ten books they read in high school, then complete a matrix task in which they could or could not cheat (Mazar, Amir, &
Ariely, 2008). Given the opportunity to cheat, the Ten Commandments reduced the proportion who did. Though focused on primes, not objects, both papers suggest that objects that prime religion (e.g., a cross) or secular morality (e.g., a gavel) could bolster ethicality by activating particular aspects of a person’s identity.

**Clean Spaces and Objects**

Overtly clean physical spaces and objects have received considerable attention as environmental cues. A rapidly-growing literature on embodied cognition has suggested that people both metaphorically and behaviorally associate morality with physical cleanliness (e.g., Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). This association is grounded basic emotions like disgust, which originally reflected a physical reaction to impure substances and foods but slowly generalized to include “disgusting” social behaviors (e.g., Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Commonplace evidence for the association between cleanliness and morality comes from the many words and concepts used to describe both (e.g., “clean” and “dirty”; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986), and the many religious rituals focused on establishing physical cleanliness in service of moral cleanliness (e.g., baptism, ablution; Preston & Ritter, 2012). Physical indicators of cleanliness, it seems, can cue people to think about a situation in moral terms and/or themselves as morally pure.

In particular, research suggests that clean objects are closely associated with ethical action, both compensating for prior unethical deeds and exacerbating current moral motives. Individuals who thought about prior unethical deeds, for example, showed an increased preference for cleanliness-related products, the use of which seemed to partially alleviate their guilt (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). In addition, individuals given the opportunity to use a cleaning product or think about cleanliness without having considered anything unethical or
disgusting regarded themselves as relatively moral and rendered harsh moral judgments (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010b; but see Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). They also placed an increased importance on their religious beliefs (Preston & Ritter, 2012), suggesting that clean products activated morally-pure aspects of their identity. Overall, this research suggests that overtly clean spaces or objects may compensate for prior moral impurity and enhance moral motives by making the moral aspects of the situation or self salient.

**Coloration and Lighting Conditions**

Physical spaces and objects necessarily appear in particular colors, and the brightness or dimness of the lighting influences the colors perceived. Like indicators of cleanliness, particular colors and lighting conditions seem to be associated with morality and morally-laden concepts. Taking inspiration from common words like “blackmail,” “blacklist,” and “blackball;” common rituals involving the colors white (e.g., weddings) or black (e.g., funerals); and cross-cultural research suggesting a global association between white-good and black-bad (e.g., Adams & Osgood, 1973), much of the research on color and morally-laden concepts has focused on the two colors of black and white. Colors, like clean spaces and objects, seem to activate particular interpretations of the situation or self, along with the associated appropriate behaviors.

In one of the most well-known demonstrations, Frank and Gilovich (1988) showed that professional football and hockey teams wearing black (versus white) uniforms both acted and were perceived to act more aggressively. While this research focused on aggressiveness rather than morality *per se*, Sherman and Clore (2009) extended these issues into the moral domain by studying implicit associations between these two colors and morally-laden words like honesty, virtuous, and evil. After linking color with cleanliness by arguing that white is seen as pure and black as a contaminant, these authors conducted three studies using a measure of implicit
association. In essence, their reaction time data suggested that people naturally associate the color white with moral and the color black with immoral concepts, especially after thinking about unethical behavior or if they especially valued cleanliness.

Recent research has also investigated the color red (Ten Velden, Baas, Shalvi, Preenen, & De Dreu, 2012). Across three studies using a computerized poker game, these authors showed that individuals displaying red (versus blue or white) poker chips acted more aggressively and felt more dominant; red chips also signaled aggressiveness to and tended to intimidate the counterpart. This pattern suggests that displaying red objects may highlight the more aggressive aspects of a person’s identity, while signaling the need for passive responses by others.

Two recent papers on the closely-related variable of light complement these findings, suggesting an association between dim lighting conditions and unethical behavior. Across three experiments, one involving dimmed lights and two involving sunglasses, one paper showed that dark conditions tend to increase cheating and self-interested behaviors by providing a sense of anonymity and signaling a situation in which unethical behavior might be acceptable (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010a). The other paper showed that recalling unethical (versus ethical) behavior led people to perceive the room as darker and express a greater desire for light-producing objects (Banerjee, Chatterjee, & Sinha, 2012). These studies suggest that dim conditions within a room, like black color, may cue less ethical views of the situation or self.

**Smells and Tastes**

Smells and tastes represent a category of environmental cue in that they are physically present in a room or its contents (e.g., food). Since the moral emotion of disgust likely originated in physical disgust to impure foods and substances (Haidt et al., 1997), issues of smell and taste are closely intertwined with issues of cleanliness and purity. In terms of smells, two papers take
inspiration from the common words used to describe suspicion and foul smells (e.g., “fishy”; Lee, Kim, & Schwarz, 2015; Lee & Schwarz, 2012). They show that literally fishy smells (fish oil) lead people to view situations and others with suspicion, thus displaying less trust or generosity. Similarly, one paper has shown that people exposed to “fart smells” make harsher moral judgments about others engaged in morally-questionable behaviors (e.g., consensual sex between second cousins, eating a dead dog; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Finally, one paper has examined the moral effects of a favorable smell (citrus-scented Windex), showing that people exposed to this smell demonstrated more reciprocity in the trust game and expressed more desire to support a charity—presumably because the smell symbolized a clean, morally-laden situation (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010).

Only one known paper has directly examined the impact of taste per se on morally-laden behaviors (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011). Building from the link between disgust and moral judgment, it showed that participants asked to consume a bitter rather than a sweet or control drink judged others’ morally-questionable behaviors more harshly. Presumably, bitter tastes activated disgust and led people to perceive the situations they were judging as “disgusting.”

**Time**

Research has explored two aspects of time and morally-relevant behaviors: the passage of time and the time-of-day when a decision occurs. Both represent environmental cues insofar as people make decisions in temporal as well as physical space, with time representing the fourth dimension (Minkowski, 1909). In terms of the passage of time, merely activating the concept of time rather than money promotes ethical behavior by making people self-reflective (as noted; Gino & Mogilner, 2014), presumably by prompting them to consider the passage of time. Several other papers have explored the passage of time more directly, suggesting that longer
decision periods give people time to consider the more ethical aspects of their identity or the situation and thus make more ethical decisions (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Yet, this effect may reverse under certain conditions, particularly if individuals use time to consider many justifications (Shalvi et al., 2012) or adopt a calculative mindset (Zhong, 2011). Overall, this research suggests that the passage of time can make people more ethical by highlighting the moral aspects of a situation or decision-maker’s identity, but this effect may be sensitive to other situational conditions.

In terms of the time-of-day when a decision occurs, Kouchaki and Smith (2014) proposed a “morning morality effect,” showing across four studies that individuals generally make more ethical choices in the morning than the evening. In the evening, it seems, they were too tired to consider the more ethical aspects of the situation or themselves. Gunia, Barnes, and Sah (2014) qualified this effect, however, by showing that it applies to “morning people” more than “evening people,” who tend to show the opposite pattern. Decisions made whenever individuals are fatigued, it appears, are morally suspect.

**NEGOTIATION AS SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING**

Scholars have clearly documented an impressive array of environmental influences on deception in non-negotiation situations. Applying these findings to the negotiation context, however, requires a clear understanding of the theoretical similarities and differences between negotiations and the contexts typically used in deception research. To do that, I first define negotiations and briefly unpack an important theoretical framework that scholars have used to study them, particularly when examining issues of deception.

Negotiations are social decision-making situations in which people with at least partially conflicting interests interact to work out the terms of their interdependence, allocate resources,
and/or resolve disputes (Brett, 2014; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Since negotiation situations come with few strong norms about how to behave, negotiations, like the situations studied in deception research, are typically ambiguous (Gunia et al., 2011). This suggests, at a basic level, that environmental cues may influence negotiation behavior (Kay et al., 2004).

Foundational negotiation theory suggests that negotiations come in two types: distributive and integrative (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In distributive negotiations, negotiators compete to claim the largest possible portion of a single, fixed resource like money (e.g., Brett, 2014). Since the objective is to claim maximum value at the other party’s expense, these negotiations stimulate competitive views of the situation and self, calling for a variety of competitive behaviors (also known as distributive strategies) like making aggressive first offers, attempting to persuade the other side, and hinting at advantageous alternatives (e.g., Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). Integrative negotiations, in turn, involve opportunities to cooperatively expand the set of resources being negotiated (produce “joint gains”) in addition to claiming value, e.g., by proposing mutually-beneficial tradeoffs (e.g., Brett, 2014). Since the objective is to create value in addition to claiming it, these negotiations stimulate more cooperative views of the situation and self, calling for a variety of more cooperative behaviors (also known as integrative strategies) like building trust, sharing information, and asking questions (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000; De Dreu et al., 2000).

Despite this clear theoretical dichotomy, however, empirical research suggests that the classification of negotiations as distributive or integrative is a matter of subjective perception more than objective reality. In particular, negotiators often classify negotiations as one or the other as a result of their conflict frames (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2001; Pinkley, 1990; 1992; Schweitzer, DeChurch & Gibson, 2005). Conflict frames are “schemas or mental representations
of conflict” (Schweitzer et al., 2005: 2126). In other words, they represent the type of conflict situation that negotiators subjectively perceive (Pinkley, 1990). A wealth of research highlights the influence of conflict frames and mental models more broadly on the way that negotiators perceive themselves, their counterparts, and the negotiation behaviors considered acceptable and appropriate (e.g., Bazerman, et al., 2000; Gelfand et al., 2001; Halevy, Chou, & Murnighan, 2012; Pinkley, 1990; 1992; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Ross & Ward, 1995; Schweitzer et al., 2005). Of particular relevance here, Schweitzer and colleagues (2005: 2134) built from Pinkley (1990) to show that negotiators commonly adopt one of two conflict frames: a competitive orientation (i.e., “win” orientation; “characterized by concern only for one’s own outcomes, even at the expense of the other party”) or a cooperative orientation (“characterized by the search for joint gains and a concern for the outcomes of both parties”). In other words, negotiators frame a negotiation as either competitive (distributive) or cooperative (integrative).

This perception is directly relevant to issues of deception because negotiators who adopted a competitive conflict frame in Schweitzer and colleagues’ (2005) research not only used more distributive strategies; they also tended to engage in heightened deception, defined in negotiation as an attempt to “manipulate the opponent’s logical and inferential processes, in order to lead the opponent to an incorrect conclusion or deduction” (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998: 667). Indeed, although negotiation scholars have sometimes theoretically differentiated distributive from unethical strategies (e.g., Shell, 1999; Thompson, 2001), real negotiators appear to make few such distinctions (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; Murnighan, 1991; Schweitzer et al., 2005). Rather, negotiators who adopt a competitive conflict frame appear to see themselves and their counterparts as competitors locked in a conflict in which both competitive and unethical behaviors are justifiable.
This finding suggests an important point of convergence between the theoretical frameworks used in the deception and negotiation literatures. Just as environmental cues can prime competitive or self-interested views of the situation and/or self, which then prompt people to act both competitively and deceptively in individual decision-making situations (e.g., Kay et al., 2004), negotiators’ competitive conflict frames prompt both distributive and deceptive negotiation behavior at the bargaining table (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2005). In other words, competitive frames produce competitive and deceptive behavior in both contexts.

Fundamentally, this suggests that the findings from the deception literature should extend to negotiation situations, with environmental cues priming competitive conflict frames that produce distributive behavior and deception.

At the same time, negotiations differ in a notable way from the contexts commonly studied in deception research: negotiations are inherently social as opposed to individual decision-making situations. While much of the deception that unfolds in everyday life undoubtedly has a social component, the contexts used in psychological studies of deception are often more individually-focused—they investigate an individual making a decision, unilaterally and on their own behalf. When the decision involves or affects other people, as it sometimes does, the focal individual may see (e.g., Gino et al., 2009), imagine (e.g., Gunia et al., 2012), or send a one-way message to those people (Gneezy, 2005). But the focal individual rarely has the opportunity to engage in a two-way conversation (i.e., an “interact”; Weick, 1980) with others. Thus, the findings may require some degree of translation before application to social decision-making situations, by which I mean situations in which individuals must engage in a two-way interaction to make a joint decision.
By definition, negotiations are social decision-making situations: they call on several individuals to make a decision together (Thompson et al., 2010) through a two-way interaction (Donohue, 1981). The social features of negotiations suggest two pathways by which environmental cues may actually have even stronger effects on deception: First, both of two negotiators might, in the course of their interaction, perceive a particular environmental cue (e.g., a black-colored object). This situation, which I refer to as “symmetric perceptions,” would likely lead both to assume a competitive conflict frame and act more distributively and deceptively. Indeed, since negotiators’ conflict frames are thought to converge over time (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994; De Dreu, van de Vliert, Carnevale, & Emans, 1995) and negotiators generally reciprocate whatever behavior their counterpart displays (e.g., Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998), symmetric perceptions of an environmental cue could spiral into a surge of distributive behavior and deception.

Second, and less obviously, just one of two negotiators might notice a particular environmental cue during the course of their interaction (“asymmetric perceptions”). The other negotiator might miss an environmental cue because they cannot easily perceive it, have already acclimatized to it, or are consciously or unconsciously transmitting the cue themself (e.g., by wearing a black-colored shirt). Regardless, under asymmetric perceptions, only the negotiator who notices the cue should initially adopt a competitive conflict frame and act more distributively and deceptively. Yet, convergence of conflict frames and reciprocation of behavior suggest that the other negotiator should eventually follow suit, adopting the focal negotiator’s competitive conflict frame and reciprocating their distributive and deceptive behavior without ever noticing the cue (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994; De Dreu et al., 1995). Whether perceptions are symmetric or asymmetric, environmental cues should eventually have stronger effects in the
social decision-making situation of negotiation. The two distinct pathways, however, offer some unique and theoretically grounded opportunities to test the intriguing hypotheses below about the convergence of conflict frames and behaviors.

In sum, converging theoretical frameworks suggest that, both outside and inside of negotiations, environmental cues may prompt competitive frames, leading to both competitive and deceptive behavior. The fact that negotiation is a social decision-making situation, however, highlights two pathways by which environmental cues could have even stronger effects on deception in negotiations. With these considerations in mind, the next section seeks to extend the findings on environmental cues and deception to negotiation, discussing the likely influence of environmental cues on negotiation behaviors and posing intriguing yet illustrative and preliminary questions about the ability of social decision-making situations like negotiation to amplify these effects.

**ENVIRONMENTAL CUES AND DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATION**

**Money**

The above research on money suggests that any features of a negotiation room or its contents that prime money-related concepts directly—e.g., cash, safes, wallets—could put one or both negotiators into a competitive conflict frame. Seeing the negotiation as distributive, they would then be expected to see both distributive behaviors like making aggressive first offers and deceptive behaviors like lying about alternatives as appropriate and acceptable—and thus act distributively and deceptively. Indeed, the above research suggests that these predictions would not be confined to objects that prime money *per se*. Rather, any indicators of wealth that implicitly prime a sense of subjective envy or deprivation—fancy desks, paintings, or antiques—could activate a competitive conflict frame along with distributive and deceptive behaviors.
These effects would naturally be exacerbated if both negotiators perceived and reacted to money cues in the same way, e.g., by feeling a sense of envy. Since it is hard to imagine how two negotiators could both feel envious of each other (or financially deprived versus each other) at the same time, however, asymmetric perceptions seem more likely. Thus, future research on the effect of money cues in negotiation may wish to focus on the drivers and consequences of asymmetric perceptions. Do such perceptions arise because the relatively wealthier negotiator has acclimatized to the trappings of their own wealth—the fancy desk or paintings in their own office, where the negotiation is happening? Or because the wealthier negotiator emits subtle (e.g., jewelry) or not-so-subtle signals of wealth (e.g., explicit comments)? Regardless, settings with obvious money cues provide a theoretically-grounded context for testing the prediction that both negotiators’ conflict frames and behaviors should eventually converge on distributive strategies and deception—a possibility that requires more research. In particular, research could investigate whether a subjectively deprived negotiator demonstrates distributive behavior and deception that a wealthier negotiator later reciprocates (without noticing their own money cues).

Since relatively little research has considered the role of environmental cues in negotiation, many of these areas (and those below) remain open to future scholarship. More broadly, future research could usefully investigate whether transactions involving large sums of cash (versus commodities) stimulate more distributive behavior and deception. Indeed, since most negotiations involve money and little negotiation research has focused on money per se, research on the ethical implications of money in negotiation seems to represent a pressing priority. These possibilities also hold some interesting implications about the findings from past research. As just one example, do business frames tend to evoke unethical choices (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) because business is psychologically associated with money?
Identity-Activating Objects

The above research on identity-activating objects holds many implications for negotiations. For example, it suggests that negotiating spaces containing objects that prime the moral aspects of the negotiators’ identities (e.g., mirrors, green products, or symbols of religious or secular morality) may discourage negotiators from assuming a competitive conflict frame or acting distributively and deceptively. Spaces containing objects that prime the less ethically-favorable aspects of a person’s identity (e.g., generic and/or counterfeit products), in turn, may have just the opposite effect.

Since negotiations typically require people to focus attention away from themselves and toward each other (Lewis & Fry, 1977), future research on identity-activating objects might first validate that such objects do have the ability to generate objective self-awareness in negotiations. Assuming they do, research might turn to the question of how they operate. Asymmetric perceptions are possible, particularly if one negotiator has acclimatized to or can more easily see a particular cue (e.g., a mirror in the room), or if a negotiator is actually transmitting the cue (e.g., by wearing a religious symbol). Additionally, negotiations over the actual purchase of green products could generate asymmetries by affording the buyer with moral credentials that subjectively license them to deceive (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). In any of these cases, the social features of negotiation would exacerbate the effects of the cue, but the mechanism would be convergence rather than symmetric perception of the cue.

Yet, research may wish to focus on the many common negotiation situations in which both negotiators perceive an identity-activating object. Given the rise of generic drugs, for example, future research could examine whether individuals negotiating the terms of a generic pharmaceutical deal somehow feel demeaned and thus tempted to adopt a competitive conflict
frame, displaying the associated distributive and deceptive behaviors. Additionally, since negotiators hammering out the terms of high-stakes deals may often choose to use a video or audio recording device, future research could investigate the logical implication that such devices may increase both negotiators’ objective self-awareness (Duval et al., 1992). Finally, future research may wish to investigate the impact of communication technologies like Skype, which display both negotiators’ images like a mirror. Could these technologies reduce distributive behavior and deception simply by increasing objective self-awareness? A careful investigation seems important, especially since psychologically distant communication media (e.g., telephone) are actually thought to increase deception (Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998). Does this pattern emerge for technologies like telephone that do not mirror a speaker’s image, but reverse for technologies that do?

**Clean Spaces and Objects**

The above research on cleanliness generally suggests that noticeably clean spaces or objects should dissuade negotiators from adopting a competitive conflict frame or displaying the associated distributive and deceptive behavior. Additionally, it suggests that the physical presence of cleansing products like hand sanitizer could help negotiators compensate for and move beyond any deception that has been discovered.

Although negotiators may symmetrically or asymmetrically perceive cleanliness cues, future research on this topic may wish to focus on a particularly intriguing set of asymmetric reactions arising from negotiators’ agency. Since individuals generally control the cleanliness of their locations, persons, and possessions, research could fruitfully investigate whether negotiators who choose to sanitize the negotiation space, dress impeccably clean, or carry especially clean objects could discourage their counterparts from adopting competitive conflict
frames and displaying the associated distributive and deceptive behaviors. Additionally, research could usefully investigate whether negotiators can diffuse emerging deception or compensate for past deception by proposing a subtle act of cleansing (e.g., straightening up) or simply placing a cleansing product (e.g., hand sanitizer) on the table.

Overall, the cleanliness domain offers a particularly appropriate context for studying the theoretically-grounded prediction that negotiators can influence each other’s conflict frames and distributive or deceptive behavior by actively altering the surrounding environment. In other words, cleanliness offers a unique opportunity to study negotiators’ active control of the situation—a topic that remains under-studied. Finally, a cleanliness perspective raises some interesting questions about past research. For example, does the general dirtiness of the spaces in which student-study participants negotiate—often littered with papers, crumbs, and trash, as any instructor can attest—contribute to the literature’s conclusion that negotiators often lie?

**Coloration and Lighting Conditions**

The findings on coloration and lighting suggest that a negotiation space featuring ample amounts of white color, white-colored objects, or light should dampen competitive conflict frames and the associated distributive and deceptive behavior. Conversely, a space featuring black coloration, red coloration, or dim lighting could actively prime these frames and behaviors. Future research on the impact of lighting conditions may wish to focus on the negotiation’s location: these cues would be expected to have the strongest effects in negotiations taking place in locations neither person frequents (e.g., a hotel conference room). In locations that one negotiator frequents (e.g., their office), acclimatization could easily reduce the effects of light on that negotiator. Teasing apart these effects offers another theoretically-grounded opportunity for studying the convergence of negotiators’ frames and behaviors, e.g., by showing that
convergence takes longer when the negotiation happens in a negotiator’s office. Other interesting questions on light abound. As just one example, do spaces featuring prominent windows dampen competitive conflict frames and the associated distributive and deceptive behaviors?

Future research on the impact of colors, in turn, may wish to build from the finding that negotiators naturally look at each other (Lewis & Fry, 1977), investigating the effects of their clothing color. Such research could be particularly informative since the literature appears to make competing predictions about the effects of color. Imagine two negotiators, one wearing a white and the other a black shirt. On the one hand, research on the white-good black-bad relationship (Sherman and Clore, 2009) suggests that the negotiator wearing the white shirt, seeing the black shirt, should adopt a competitive conflict frame and display distributive and deceptive behavior, while the negotiator wearing the black shirt should react just the opposite. On the other hand, Frank and Gilovich’s (1988) work on sports teams suggests that people may engage in a self-perception process concerning their own clothing. Thus, the negotiator wearing the white shirt might see themself as cooperative or docile, dampening distributive and deceptive behavior, whereas the negotiator wearing the black shirt should see themself in just the opposite light. Testing these competing predictions offers a compelling direction for future research, especially since either possibility would also allow scholars to consider what happens when negotiators adopt opposing conflict frames. Finally, a coloration and lighting perspective raises interesting questions about past research. Some intriguing past research, for example, suggests that negotiators are more likely to deceive when providing an e-signature versus a physical signature (Chou, 2015). Could this result stem, in part, from the fact that e-signatures typically appear in black, while physical signatures at least sometimes appear in blue? Among physical signatures, would blue signatures be more psychologically binding than black?
Smells and Tastes

The research on smells and tastes suggests that foul smells or bad tastes could prime competitive conflict frames that lead the negotiators to view each other suspiciously and judge each other’s moral indiscretions harshly. Conversely, a clean-smelling space may dampen competitive conflict frames and lead the negotiators to act prosocially rather than distributively and deceptively (e.g., Steinel, Utz, & Koning, 2010).

Symmetric perceptions of smell and taste cues are possible, particularly if the negotiation takes place in a location with prominent and unfamiliar smells and tastes (e.g., a restaurant). Yet, future research on smells and tastes may wish to focus more attention on asymmetric perceptions. One reason is that negotiators themselves represent a major source of smells (e.g., from the perfumes or shampoos they use, foods they eat) but may acclimatize quickly to the smells they themselves emit. Thus, a negotiator’s strong perfume could markedly influence the counterpart’s conflict frame and behaviors but have little impact on their own. Another reason to focus on asymmetric perceptions is that people can react to the same food or drink in very different ways (e.g., Hoegg & Alba, 2007). Thus, even if two negotiators are sharing food or drink, they could readily have different psychological reactions. What would happen if one negotiator experienced a cup of coffee from a common pot as delicious, while the other experienced it as bitter? Although the existing study on bitter tastes (Eskine et al., 2011) suggests opposing impacts on each negotiator’s conflict frame, more research is needed before drawing firm conclusions. Finally, the research on taste and smell raises interesting questions about past research. For example, people may engage in enhanced cheating when hungry (Yam, Reynolds, & Hirsch, 2014); do favorable smells wafting from nearby food exacerbate this tendency?

Time
The above research on time suggests that symbols of time (e.g., clocks) could dampen competitive conflict frames and the associated distributive and deceptive behaviors, while long negotiation periods may diffuse such frames and behaviors (though several other situational factors could moderate that effect). Additionally, the research suggests that competitive conflict frames and deception are more likely to occur at a time-of-day when the negotiators are tired.

Research on the effects of time cues may wish to focus on the source of the cues. Does time become salient because one negotiator is sending signals about time (e.g., by checking a watch), which would probably prompt asymmetric reactions? Or because both negotiators can see a prominent clock or setting sun, which would probably prompt more symmetric reactions? Research on the period of time in which a negotiation unfolds, in turn, may wish to focus on the mechanisms by which extended decision processes diffuse versus exacerbate competitive conflict frames. Do negotiators get too tired to keep competing? Or does the passage of time incline them even more strongly toward competitive and potentially unethical posturing?

In light of morning and evening people’s differing reactions to time-of-day (Gunia et al., 2014), research on that topic might focus on the inherent asymmetries: Does a particular negotiator’s conflict frame and distributive or deceptive behavior vary over the course of a day, according to their chronotype? At a particular point in a day (e.g., the morning), does a negotiator experiencing a circadian trough (i.e., an evening person) display higher levels of distributive or deceptive behavior than a negotiator experiencing a peak (i.e., a morning person)? Which frame and set of behaviors predominate when a morning person and evening person meet at the bargaining table? Chronotype appears to be a “hot topic” in management (Volk, Pearsall, Christian, & Becker, 2017), and answers to such questions could greatly advance the literature. Finally, the findings on time raise some intriguing questions about prior findings. Since most
negotiation studies take place over short periods of time (e.g., 30 minutes), does existing research overestimate the deception that occurs when people have more time to consider the ethicality of their tactics? These and many other intriguing questions await future research.

**ENVIRONMENTAL CUES AND SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING**

Negotiations are but one of the many social decision-making situations in which organizational actors interact to make ambiguous decisions that resolve partially conflicting objectives. Some other prominent examples include top management team decisions, promotion contests, cross-divisional collaborations, research and development efforts, joint ventures, strategic alliances, CEO-board interactions, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Thus, the research on environmental cues may hold relevance for the deception that emerges in many social decision-making situations within organizations. To highlight the possibilities, this section focuses on one such context, M&A, raising two illustrative research questions about the influence of each environmental cue on deception in that setting.

Before doing so, some clear caveats are in order. First, the following ideas are obviously illustrative rather than comprehensive. Second, given the dearth of attention to environmental cues in academic management, many of the following ideas are also tentative and preliminary, representing potentially fruitful avenues for future work. Thus, the goal is not to argue for specific effects but rather to illustrate the intriguing possibilities that arise when management scholars consider environmental cues in organizational context. Finally, since individuals’ behavior in any social decision-making situation within organizations is multiply-determined, environmental cues are likely to represent one of many influences on deceptive behavior, and not always the most prominent. In keeping with much of the management literature, then, the

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2 My thanks to the editor, who suggested a focus on this context.
argument is not that the focal construct (environmental cues) will singlehandedly or always dictate the focal behavior (deception). It is merely that environmental cues represent one important and understudied factor that can help us better understand deception in social decision-making situations, an examination of which could advance both theory and practice.

Environmental Cues and M&A

Scholars of management and many other disciplines have long shown an interest in M&A (e.g., Halebian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison, 2009). Since the acquirer and target in an M&A deal often have at least partially conflicting objectives and must interact over an extended period to reconcile those objectives—all in an environment of extreme ambiguity (e.g., Marks & Mirvis, 2001)—M&A exemplifies many social decision-making situations in organizations. For the very same reasons, however, M&A deals may present the involved individuals with temptations to deceive. Just as negotiators may deceive throughout a negotiation to gain an advantage, the parties to an M&A deal may deceive at each stage of the M&A process. To offer just a few examples, they could seek to inflate or deflate the appropriate price during the pre-combination phase, pursue personal or departmental agendas during the combination phase, or resist the longer-term changes needed to realize the expected synergies. In sum, M&A typifies social decision-making in organizations but may also present opportunities to deceive, raising the possibility that environmental cues could influence whether they do.

To offer just a few illustrative examples of each type of environmental cue, the above findings on money may apply insofar as M&A deals often involve vast sums of either money or stock. It would be interesting to know whether deals structured to emphasize money rather than stock incline both sides toward competitive conflict frames, along with distributive behavior and deception. Likewise, issues of money may become prominent when large and financially
successful organizations seek to acquire smaller organizations. If the requisite meetings take place in the much larger and richer organization’s headquarters, do representatives of the smaller company experience a sense of envy or deprivation that stimulates competitive conflict frames?

The findings on identity-activating objects, in turn, may become particularly relevant for pharmaceutical mergers, in which generic drugs often feature prominently. Given the association between generic products and reduced self-worth (Chiou & Chao, 2011), do the involved parties somehow feel demeaned and thus susceptible to competitive frames and unethical temptations? Additionally, the research on mirrors may apply to many types of M&A deals since many involve firms in disparate locations (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), requiring a reliance on technologies like Skype that mirror the parties’ images. Does enabling versus disabling this feature (or using a technology that does versus does not have it) dampen competitive frames and lead the parties to be more forthcoming?

Issues of cleanliness, in turn, may become particularly relevant during the integration phase, which can often be both literally and figuratively messy (Marks & Mervis, 2001). As locations shutter and the merged entity requires employees or even entire divisions to move to realize synergies (Shaver, 2006), for example, office spaces are likely to become extraordinarily messy and disorganized. So too, the thicket of organizational policies, procedures, roles, reporting relationships, and information technologies that the merged entity must somehow reconcile across the two prior entities. Does the literal or figurative messiness of the integration process leave employees more susceptible to competitive conflict frames and deception? Since the above findings on cleanliness arise because of the metaphorical association between physical and moral cleanliness, it seems as least possible.
The logos of the two prior entities or one merged entity, in turn, may evoke issues of color and light. If an acquirer is prominently identified with a logo featuring black coloration, for example, do their efforts seem more hostile to the acquired (particularly if their own logo features prominent white coloration)? Similarly, if the merged entity develops a new logo and features it prominently in emails, on posters, or on the internet, does its color prime particular conflict frames or ethical tendencies? Finally, issues of light could come into play when discussions of the deal stretch late into the night, creating the risk of dim conditions (as well as fatigue, described below).

Issues of taste and smell, in turn, might matter insofar as the meetings required to consummate a merger are catered or occur in a restaurant. Do meetings in restaurants emitting favorable smells suppress competitive conflict frames and the associated distributive and deceptive behaviors? Given the association between bitterness and harsh moral judgments (Eskine et al., 2011), does bitter-tasting coffee lead the parties to judge their counterparts’ deceptive tactics more severely? Additionally, consider the major risks to a merger posed by employee resistance (Larsson & Finkelstein) and culture clashes (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Could good rather than cheaply and hastily-ordered food at employee roundtables take the edge off of harsh employee judgments, at least paving the way for an open discussion? It is certainly an interesting possibility, albeit a possibility requiring much more research (along with careful attention to the underlying ethical considerations).

Finally, issues of time may apply insofar as M&A meetings stretch late into the night or start early in the morning, when some managers may be deep in a circadian trough. Do morning people tend to act competitively and deceptively in evening meetings, and evening people in morning meetings? Considering the proliferation of cross-border M&A (Larsson & Finkelstein,
1999), it is also possible that such issues could arise as a result of time zones. Following the predictions of the morning morality effect (Kouchaki & Smith, 2014), for example, might American managers who wake up early to Skype with Japanese managers (in their evening) show a reduced inclination toward competition and deception just because of the time zones? While illustrative, tentative, and preliminary, all of these possibilities seem sufficiently intriguing to whet the appetite of M&A scholars, and hopefully the appetite of management scholars in other areas who can see the relevance by analogy.

**DISCUSSION**

Recent psychological advances reveal that environmental cues—features of the surrounding physical or temporal situation—can prime particular views of the situation or self that lead individuals to deceive. Yet, research on deception in the social decision-making situation of negotiation has not often taken up the topic of environmental cues. Notwithstanding the many possible reasons for this gap, the current paper has sought to stimulate negotiation scholars’ interest, showing that a focus on environmental cues can both raise and answer an array of theoretically-rich research questions. Additionally, it has suggested that a focus on environmental cues might advance the research programs of management scholars studying an array of other social decision-making situations in organizations, like M&A.

This approach has highlighted an interesting path forward for the negotiation literature, provided both that literature and the psychological deception literature with a novel categorization system to organize the many documented environmental cues, and sought to encourage more attention to the surrounding environment across academic management. Implicitly, it has also highlighted many ways that real negotiators could consider altering the environment to elicit honesty from themselves and/or their counterparts. In the absence of
additional research, however, such implications should be treated with caution. Indeed, even in the presence of supportive evidence, negotiators should approach the environmental cue with moral awareness, recognizing the ethical implications of manipulating the environment without an interdependent colleague’s awareness.

Overall, and based on the ideas above, I conclude that both the negotiation literature and the many other management literatures that study social decision-making situations would benefit substantially by considering the physical and temporal situations surrounding the focal phenomena. Thus, I urge management researchers of all stripes to explicitly study the environmental cues in their own contexts, or at least consider and potentially control for them. While the relevant management literatures are too numerous and diverse to permit the outlining of a comprehensive research agenda, I now offer some suggestions for future negotiation research on environmental cues, which may serve as a template for other management literatures.

Given the relative dearth of negotiation research on environmental cues, it would seem important for future research on that topic to anchor itself in well-validated negotiation constructs (e.g., interests; Fisher & Ury, 1981) and use well-validated paradigms for measuring conflict frames (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2005) and deception (e.g., the Bullard Houses case; [www.negotiationexercises.com](http://www.negotiationexercises.com)). For example, research could examine whether buyers in the Bullard Houses case more often assume a competitive frame and lie about their interests under certain environmental conditions. Within these contexts, it would seem important to carefully manipulate one environmental cue at a time, remaining vigilant against subtle environmental confounds (e.g., a study of nice smells contaminated by dirty spaces). In addition to studying validated constructs, negotiation scholars may wish to examine the effects of specific
environmental cues on validated mechanisms (e.g., business frames; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) that may work alongside or in concert with conflict frames.

All of these suggestions should help to maximize internal validity, but the negotiation literature would also want to ensure that any documented effects have correlates in real-world negotiations. Finally, given the recent crises of replicability and research ethics in psychology (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), negotiation scholars would likely want to produce and publish independent replications and non-replications, as well as studies with less-than-perfect results. Slowly but steadily, measures like these should contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the various ways that environmental cues shape conflict frames, along with distributive and deceptive behaviors.

In sum, the current paper has sought to elevate the prominence of environmental cues, thereby motivating negotiation and other management scholars to study these cues as drivers of deception. While this paper has only scratched the surface of the research possibilities, those possibilities seem promising enough to motivate a new body of intriguing and theoretically-informative work. If so, then I expect the environmental cue to soon assume its place among the major drivers of decision-making in organizations.
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Table 1: Journals, Search Terms, and Number of Articles Reviewed

*Journals Searched*

- All Academy of Management Journals
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Journal of Applied Psychology
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Journal of Management
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Nature
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Psychological Science
- Science

*Search Terms*

- Cheat
- Deceive
- Deception
- Dishonest
- Ethical
- Honest
- Honesty
- Immoral
- Lie
- Moral
- Truth
- Unethical

**Number of Articles Reviewed**

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